4. DID Administration officials believe that the war in Iraq would be easy?
The most powerful analysis of the downsides of going to war in Iraq came not from the State Department or the CIA. It came from Donald Rumsfeld.
"The [Defense Department's] list was more wide-ranging and hard-hitting than any warning I saw from State or the CIA-even though their leaders are widely viewed as the Administration's voices of caution on the war."
The Iraq Survey Group found that Saddam Hussein retained both the intention and the capability to revive bio-chemical weapons programs after sanctions were ended.
"The CIA's unsupportable statements about Iraqi stockpiles and WMD activity did not justify critics in making unsupportable pronouncements of their own, to the effect that Saddam had no WMD ambitions or capabilities."
9. WAS the war in Iraq fought only to remove WMD stockpiles?
Saddam's pattern of aggression, defiance, and ties to terrorists were a major concern, made all the more serious by his programs of WMD development.
"We worried that, in his effort to dominate the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East, Saddam would aim to deter outside intervention by developing his conventional and WMD capabilities, along with the prohibited long-range missiles (or, possibly, terrorist alliances) to deliver them."